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EXHIBIT 9 
CODALE ELECTRIC 
HYPOTHETICAL LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE 
AS OF JANUARY 31,1994 
(in $000's) 
Book Liquidation 
ASSETS Value Value 
CASH(1) 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (2) 
INVENTORIES (3) 
OTHER CURRENT ASSETS (4) 
PROPERTY & EQUIPMENT (5) 
OTHER ASSETS (6) 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS (7) 
TOTAL ASSETS 
TOTAL ESTIMATED REALIZABLE 
VALUE OF ASSETS 
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 
CURRENT LIABILITIES (8) 
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES (8) 
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & 
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY 
TOTAL ESTIMATED REALIZABLE 
VALUE OF LIABILITIES 
ESTIMATED LIQUIDATION VALUE 2,807.5 
326.4 
4,711.6 
2,270.0 
325.8 
906.6 
238.1 
347.2 
9,125.7 
5,230.3 
602.0 
3,293.4 
9,125.7 
326.4 
4,476.0 
2,366.9 
325.8 
906.6 
238.1 
0.0 
8,639.8 
5,230.3 
602.0 
0.0 
5,832.3 
Notes: See following page 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, ) RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S 
) MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
Plaintiff, Appellee, ) OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
and Cross-Appellant, ) 
) Case No. 950169-CA 
v. ) 
VICKIE L. HOLT, ) 
Defendant, Appellant, ) 
and Cross-Appellee. ) 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Response to URCP 23 Motion to Strike. The Appellant, 
Vickie L. Holt ("WIFE"), responds to Appellee Dale P. Holt's 
(HUSBAND") URAP 23 Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's Brief as 
follows: 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike -1 
Am>endix "0" 
II 
RESPONSE TO "FACTUAL BACKGROUND" 
2. Husband failed to mention hearing of Wife' s URCP 59 Motion 
or the resulting order. Husband's "Factual Background for this 
Motion" is incomplete, in that he has omitted other important 
proceedings by the trial court. Husband's failure to consider the 
2/14/95 hearing or the resulting Order1 probably explains why he 
filed a a non-meritorious motion to strike, and why he erroneously 
asserted therein that the matters sought to be struck from Wife's 
brief had not been considered by the trial court,2 when they had 
been argued and ruled upon. 
3. Husband's omissions. Husband's omissions in his "Factual 
Background" summary include the following: 
(a) Failure to include 2/4/95 Order and Judgment. Husband's 
summary failed to mention the Court's 2/4/95 (ten page) "Order and 
Judgment" wherein the Court made extensive findings and orders 
concerning custody, visitation, alimony, child support, insurance, 
distribution of assets, etc. * However, that omission does not 
substantially affect his Motion to Strike. 
1
 See discussion in f 3(b) below. 
2
 Husband incorrectly alleges that "A significant portion of Mrs. Hot's Brief contains references to 
evidence submitted post-trial and not considered by the Court when making its ruling." [See page 1 of Husband's 
Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's Brief']. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 2 
(b) Failure to include 2/14/95 hearing and 3-21-95 "Order in 
re: Defendant's Motion to Correct Judgment, for a New Trial, etc." 
Husband's summary of proceedings failed to mention the 2/14/95 
hearing and oral argument3 re Wife's URCP 59 Motion or the 
resulting 3/21/95 "Order in re: Defendant's Motion to Correct 
Judgment, for a New Trial, etc., which denied Wife's URCP 59 
Motion.4 Husband's failure to include that Order is curious, since 
in 1 14 Husband's memorandum he refers to the Court's 3/21/95 
"Order on Post Trial Motions",5 says that a copy is attached as Ex. 
X>C", but instead his Ex. X>C" contains a copy of the omitted Court 
3/21/95 Order denying Wife's URCP 59 Motion. 
Ill 
ARGUMENT 
T r i a l Court C o n s i d e r e d Data Sought t o b e Struck 
4. Husband's argument miss ta tes the f a c t s . Counsel for 
Husband argues t h a t s ince Wife ' s URCP 59 Motion and suppor t ing 
3
 R. 532 & 540. 
4
 R. 540-541 and Ex. " C to Husband's Motion to Strike. 
5
 R. 534-539. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 3 
affidavits were filed after the 11/5/94 hearing,6 that for some 
unexplained reason they must be: 
"evidence . . . which was not considered by 
the trial court in its rulings, which under 
Utah law should not be considered on appeal."7 
(emphasis added) 
and that they are allegedly are 
"outside the scope of evidence."8 (Emphasis 
added) 
Counsel for Husband is in error. The arguments in Wife's URCP 59 
Motion, supporting affidavits, etc. were "considered by the Court" 
6
 Wife's URCP 59 Motion [R. 400-502, 505-513 & 528-531] sought relief and was based upon various 
grounds as follows: 
1. URCP 59(a)(3) [accident or surprise]; URCP 59(a)(4) [newly discovered evidence]; URCP 59(a)(5) [newly 
discovered evidence]; URCP 59)a)(6) [insufficiency of evidence]; and URCP 59(a)(7) [error in law]. 
2. URCP 59(e) [Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Orders]. 
3. Incorporated by reference Wife's 11/3/94 "Defendant's Memorandum re Motion to Correct Ruling and to 
Distribute Additional Assets or for a New trial," a copy of which was attached thereto as Ex. #1. 
4. Argued that at 11/4/94 hearing the Court declined to hear arguments raised by Wife's 11/3/94 Memorandum 
and invited Wife to bring those matters before the Court after entry of Findings, Conclusions and Order. Wife 
moved the Court for an order vacating the 11/4/94 "Order on Post Trial Motions" to the extent that it purported to 
deny Wife's 11/3/94 Motions. 
5. Attached the affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter and referred to trial testimony and exhibits. 
6. Stated that the motion pertained to Findings, Conclusion, Order and Judgement, Order on Post Trial Motions; 
and generally to orders and decisions pertaining to distribution of assets, payment of taxes, award of alimony, child 
support, payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees, costs, life insurance, mandatory withholding and other 
orders pertaining to financial matters. 
7
 Page 1 of Husband's Memorandum. 
8
 See second introductory ^ in Exhibit "A", page 6 to Husband's Motion to Strike." 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 4 
in Making its 3/21/95 Order, and are not "outside the scope of 
evidence" as alleged. 
5. Husband's argument ignores 2/14/95 hearing and 3/21/95 
Order. Husband's argument ignores the 2/14/95 hearing and the 
Court's resulting 3/21/95 order,9 improperly asks the Court to 
strike reference to and to disregard the proceedings which occurred 
after the November 5, 1994 hearing,10 and improperly seeks to limit 
the record on appeal to the trial and the 11/5/94 hearing. Contrary 
to Husband's argument, the trial court did hear oral argument of 
Wife's URCP 59 Motion and entered an order denying that motion.11 
6. Wife appealed from denial of her URCP 59 Motion. Wife's 
appeal specifically includes an appeal from the Court's post-trial 
orders.12 As indicated above, counsel for Husband incorrectly 
states that the potions of Wife's brief which he is asking the 
Court to strike were allegedly not considered by the trial Court.13 
He is wrong. Wife is entitled to appeal from the Court's denial of 
9
 Copy attached as Ex. "C" to Husband's Motion to Strike. 
10
 See second 1f of Exhibit "A" to Husband's Motion to Strike, wherein he states: 
All reference to the "Record ("R") after record page 400 are outside the scope 
of evidence heard at trial or in the November 5,1994 Hearing." 
11
 The Court's 3/21/95 Order recites that Wife's URCP 59 Motion and errata thereto were argued to the 
Court by counsel for the parties, and the Court's ruling thereon was reduced to writing in that Order, which is 
entitled "Order in re: Defendant's Motion to Correct Judgment, for a Ne Trial, etc," 
12
 See content of the Amended Notice of Appeal, R. 548-549. 
13
 See footnote #2 above. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 5 
her URCP 59 Motion. Citations to the record in support of that 
portion of the appeal are proper and appropriate and should not be 
struck. 
7. Cases re striking briefs. As discussed below, the cases 
cited by counsel for Husband do not support his Motion to Strike. 
(a) Maughn v. Maughn. In Maughn v. Maughn,1A cited by 
Husband, the Court of Appeals properly struck documents not in the 
record and which were presented for the first time with a reply 
brief. Unlike Maughn, in the present case Wife's URCP 59 Motion, 
affidavits, etc. were presented to and ruled upon by the trial 
court. 
(b) Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird. In 
Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird,15 a party sought 
to supplement the record on appeal with a deposition that had not 
been submitted to the trial court in connection with a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court of Appeals properly held that 
"evidence not available to the trial judge cannot be added to the 
record on Appeal" (citation omitted). As indicated above, in the 
present case the evidence sought to be struck was not only 
available to the trial court, but the trial court heard oral 
14
 Maughn v. Maughn (Utah Ct.App. 1989) 770 P.2d 156. 
15
 Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 781 P.2d 452. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 6 
argument thereon and signed a written order denying that motion. 
Baird, supra, supports Wife's argument that since that evidence was 
"available to the trial judge" it can properly be considered on 
appeal• 
(c) Chapman v. Chapman. In Chapman v. Chapman16 the Supreme 
Court properly refused to consider answers to interrogatories and 
requests for admissions attached as an addendum to appellant's 
brief, but which were "outside the record." Chapman does not 
support Husband's argument since Wife's URCP 59 Motion and 
supporting affidavits, etc. were not "outside the record" but are 
an integral part of the record. 
(d) Covert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen. In Covert Copier 
Painting v. Van Leeuwen (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 801 P.2d 163, 170, the 
Utah Court of Appeals properly refused to consider an interrogatory 
answer and an affidavit filed in connection with an earlier motion, 
where: 
"Neither this affidavit nor the 
interrogatories were included in the materials 
supplied to the judge when he decided Van 
Leeuwen's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Emphasis added). 
16
 Chapman v. Chapman, (Utah 1986), 728 P.2d 121, 123. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 7 
Unlike Covert, supra, as discussed above, in the present case the 
affidavits and other documents sought to be struck were "included 
in the materials supplied to the judge." 
(e) Jackson v. Remington Park, Inc. In Jackson v. Remington 
Park, Inc. (Okl. App. 1994) 874 P.2d 814, the Court properly held 
that an affidavit filed the day after the Court's ruling was not 
evidence before the court at the time of the ruling on the summary 
judgment motion and was not properly part of the record on appeal. 
As discussed above, in our case Wife's URCP 59 Motion, supporting 
affidavits, etc. were before the Court, were ruled upon and are 
properly part of the record on appeal from the trial court's denial 
of Wife's URCP 59 Motion. Similarly, in Moon Lake Elec. v. Ultra 
Systems W. Const. (Utah Ct.App. 1988) 767 P.2d 125 at 128 the Court 
of Appeals properly rejected an argument that a summary judgment 
should be reversed based upon untimely affidavits and unpublished 
depositions. 
8. Citations to legal authorities in Wife's Appendix which 
Husband seeks to have struck. Without supporting argument, 
Husband's Motion to Strike17 improperly seeks to strike Wife's URAP 
24(11) (A) legal authorities. URAP 24(11) (A) provides for inclusion 
in an appendix copies of statutes, rules, regulations, etc. of 
See Exhibit "A" to Motion to Strike, page 6. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 8 
central importance which are not reproduced verbatim in the brief. 
In compliance with that rule, Wife included copies of such items in 
her addendum, which Husband now seeks to strike for some 
unexplained reason. Authorities and materials included in Wife's 
Appendix are summarized in the footnote.18 Those materials have 
been included pursuant to URAP 24(11) (A) and for the convenience of 
the Court and should not be struck. 
9. Shield's affidavit. Paul Shield's19 affidavit20 analyzes the 
financial consequences of the Court's division of assets, etc. 
Among other things, he furnished computations, charts and graphs to 
demonstrate that Husband received substantially more than ^  of the 
18
 URAP materials included in Wife's Appendix, which Husband seeks to strike, include the following: 
Appendix C - Copy of 26 USCS § 1041 - Federal tax statute re taxability of transfers of property between spouses 
or incident to divorce. 
Appendix D - Copy of: 
(a) Commerce Clearing House Income Taxes ^  32,70, pages 55,278 through 55,285; and 
(b) IRS Temporary Regulations concerning 26 USCS § 1041. 
Appendix E - Copy of USCS § 301 re tax consequence from distribution of property. 
Appendix F - Copy of IRS rules re distributions of money and property. 
Appendix G - Copy of National Office Technical Advise Memorandum re taxability of distribute ins in redemption 
of stock and of transfers between spouses or incident to divorce. 
Appendix H - Copy of Article from Journal of Corporate Taxation which discusses the Ninth Circuit Antes case 
and subsequent Tax Court cases re taxability of redemptions of stock incident to a divorce. 
19
 Mr. Paul Shields is a Certified Public Accountant employed by Neilson Elggren Durkin & Co. 
20
 Appendix B - Copy of Paul Shields 2/1/95 Affidavit and attachments thereto. R. 476-493. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike - 9 
marital assets, even based upon the Court's having charged Husband 
only salvage value for the marital business, to demonstrate the 
inequality in the Court's division of martial assets, the 
inequality of resulting earnings, etc. Until the Court made a 
decision no such affidavit, computations, projections, etc. could 
be made. Shield's affidavit and supporting materials were properly 
filed in support of Wife's URCP 59 Motion, and should not be 
struck. They could not have been filed in connection with the 
11/5/94 hearing since the Court had not yet made a decision to 
which he could address his affidavit. Mr. Shield's affidavit and 
supporting materials were before the Court when it made its 3/21/95 
order denying Wife's URCP 59 Motion.21 
10. Hunter's affidavit. Robert D. Hunter's affidavit22 
analyzes the income tax consequences of the Court's order re asset 
distribution, and presented a proposal which, if it had been 
adopted by the Court, would have decreased the tax consequences 
from about $440,000 using the Court's method of dividing marital 
assets, to about $30,000 if his proposed alternative asset 
distribution method were used. Among other things, Mr. Hunter 
furnished computations, charts and graphs to demonstrate the tax 
consequences under different scenarios. Until the Court made a 
21
 Appendix B - Copy of Paul Shields 2/1/95 Affidavit and attachments thereto. R. 476-493. 
22
 Appendix I - Copy of Robert Hunter's 2/6/95 Affidavit and attachments thereto R. 495-502. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike -10 
decision no such affidavit, computations, projections, etc. could 
be made. Hunter's affidavit and supporting materials were properly 
filed in support of Wife's URCP 59 Motion, and should not be 
struck. They could not have been filed in connection with the 
11/5/94 hearing since the Court had not yet made a decision to 
which he could address his affidavit. Mr. Shield's affidavit and 
supporting materials were before the Court when it made its 3/21/95 
order denying Wife's URCP 59 Motion.23 
11. Appendix O is a summary of plaintiff's trial exhibit. 
The first five lines of Appendix 0 is a summary of income 
projections for the family business made by Husband's expert, and 
the next five lines are an additional five year projection made 
therefrom.24 It is difficult to understand Husband's argument as to 
why a summary of his own trial exhibit should be struck. 
12. Arguments and footnotes. Without description, argument or 
explanation, Husband asks the Court to Strike about nineteen 
references and arguments in Wife's brief.25 Husband's Motion to 
Strike is too vague and indefinite to permit a meaningful response. 
23
 R. 495-502. 
24
 The first five lines on Appendix O are summarized from Husband's Expert's Exhibit #3 to Husband's 
trial exhibit #21, which project income from the family business forward for five years through 1999. Based 
thereon Wife's expert, Shields, carried that projection forward another five years, through 2004, as shown on lines 
6 through 10. 
25
 See Exhibit "A", page 6 to Husband's Motion to Strike, where Husband supplies a laundry list of 
paragraphs in Wife's brief, with related footnotes, without further explanation. 
Wife's Response to Motion to Strike -11 
To the extent, if at all, that Husband seeks to strike arguments or 
footnotes based upon his incorrect argument that Wife's URCP 59 
Motion and the supporting affidavits by Shields and Hunter were 
allegedly not available to or were allegedly not considered by the 
Court in making its ruling, Husband's motion to strike arguments 
and footnotes should be denied because, as discussed above, that 
motion and those affidavit were not only available but were argued 
and ruled upon by the Court. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Husband's Motion to Strike is without merit. It should be 
summarily denied and Wife should be awarded her attorney fees 
incurred in connection with that motion. 
Dated June 15, 1996. 
Ronald C. Barker, attorney for Appellant Vickie Holt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed the 15th day of June, 1996, to the following persons at the 
addresses indicated: 
E. Paul Wood, Esq. 
Ann L. Wasserman, Esq. 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Ronald C. Barker 
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RECEIVED 
JUN ' I 1996 
RECEIVED RONALD C. BARKER 
E . PAUL WOOD - 3537 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 *"'N 2 1 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt, /ffWfeW 
Appellee and'Cross Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DALE P. HOLT, 
ATTYATUW 
Plaintiff, Appellee 
and Cross Appellant, 
v. 
VICKIE L. HOLT, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross Appellee 
REPLY TO APPELLANT 
VICKIE L. HOLT'S 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF APPELLANT'S BRTEF 
Case No. 950169-CA 
Judge 
. ooOoo 
Appellant, Vickie L. Holt's Response to Appellee Dale P. 
Holt's Motion to Strike Portions of Vickie Holt's Appeal Brief 
entirely misinterprets the primary thrust of the Motion to Strike 
and admits that the evidence which Dale Holt seeks to strike from 
the Appeal Brief was not admitted into evidence before the trial 
court when the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment on January 4, 1995." 
1. Dale Holt moves this Court to strike portions of 
Vickie Holt's Appeal Brief. The basis of the Motion is that Vickie 
Holt bases segments of her arguments contained in her Appeal Brief 
Appendix "R" 
that the Court's Findings of Factf Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
entered January 4, 1995 should be set aside and are erroneous, on 
evidence iti !the form of Affidavits, Articles and Summaries filed 
with Vickie Holt's Rule 59 Motion on February 2, 1995. Mr. Holt's 
point in making this Motion is very simple: the trial court did 
not have the evidence before it on January 4, 1995 when it ruled on 
the merits of the trial held June 13-15, 1994. Since the evidence 
was not before the trial court when it made its decision, the 
evidence cannot be used as a basis for finding that the Court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgment are in error. 
2. Vickie Holt admits that the Affidavits of Paul 
Shields and Robert Hunter and the various summaries and exhibits of 
which Mr. Holt complains were submitted with the Rule 59 Motion 
subsequent to the Court's January 4, 1995 ruling. (Vickie Holt 
Response, section 5, 9, 10 and 11). 
3. In her Response, Vickie Holt erroneously attempts to 
bootstrap use of the subsequently filed evidence as a basis for 
appealing the Court's January 4, 1995 Findings, Conclusion and 
Judgment. Mrs. Holt asserts that since she has appealed the trial 
court's denial of her Rule 59 Motion,, the evidence submitted in 
connection with the Rule 59 Motion was "before the court" and "not 
outside of the scope of evidence", (Vickie Holt's Response, 
section 4). 
2 
First, while Mrs. Holt may have appealed from the trial 
court's denial of her Rule 59 Motion in the sense that she makes a 
statement to that effect in her Amended Notice of Appeal, Mrs. 
Holt's Appeal Brief is totally barren of any reference to appealing 
from the Rule 59 Motion. At page 1, section I, "Jurisdiction", 
Mrs. Holt states: 
This is appeal from a final alimony, child 
support and marital assets distribution order 
as part of a divorce entered by the Second 
Judicial District Court. (Appeal Brief, p. 1) 
At page 2, subsection 11(b) of Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief, 
she recites the issues which she is appealing, none of which 
includes denial of her Rule 59 Motion; 
The issues presented for review in wife's 
appeal are as follows: 
Distribution of Marital Estate 
Alimony and Child Support 
Witness Fees 
Wife's Attorney Fees 
Insufficient Findings 
Finally at page 8, subsection 7 of Mrs. Holt's Appeal 
Brief, she recites in subparts (a) through (n) the "matters 
challenged by Appeal", none of which address denial of the Rule 59 
Motion. There is simply no argument, case citation or standard 
submitted by Mrs. Holt on the issue of appealing denial of the Rule 
59 Motion. 
3 
Second, even in the event Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief 
appropriately argued denial of her Rule 59 Motion, the evidence 
submitted iri connection with the Rule 59 Motion could only be 
considered by the Court of Appeals in connection therewith and not 
as a basis for setting aside the court's Findings of Facyt or 
holding that the trial court committed error in the Conclusions of 
Law of Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The citations to portions of Mrs. Holt's Brief contained 
in Exhibit "A" to the Dale Holt's Motion to Strike all contain 
evidence which was submitted with Mrs. Holt's Rule 59 Motion which 
should be stricken from Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of June, 1996. 
LI^ELEFIELD & PETERSON 
vyfc'E. Paul Wood; Esq. 
By: Ann L. Wassermann, Esq. 
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt 
Appellee and Cross Appellant 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy 
of the foregoing, REPLY TO APPELLANT VICKIE L. HOLT'S RESPONSE TO 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF, this ^ / ^ d a y of 
June, 1996, to: 
RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200 
Murray, Utah 84123 
w6\holt.mem 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APP8ALS 
ocOoo 
Dale P. Holt, 
Plaintiff, Appellee, and 
Cross-appellant, 
vickie L. Holt, 
Defendant, Appellant, and 
Croas-appellee. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 0 2 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
: a s e No, 950163-CA 
This matter is before zhe court upon appellee's motion, 
filed Kay 24, 1996, to strike a portion of appellants brisf. On 
June 17, 1996, appellant filed a response to appellee's motion to 
strike, and on June 20, 1996, appellee filed a repLy to 
appellant's response, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellee's xr.oticn to strike is 
denied. Appellant's second brief, as described in Rule 24(g), 
Utah R. App. P., shall be filed no later than 33 days from the 
date of this order« 
Date 
FOR THE COURT 
d t h i s ^/xiay of Ju ly , 1996, 
Mofnan H Jack 
^fO^^^y 
Judge 
TabT 
304 Idaho 701 PACIFIC HEPORTER, 2d SERIES 
> 
(D 
a 
H. 
PER CURIAM. 
In August 1983, Rod Peterson, a motor 
home dealer, loaned a pickup truck to Ivan 
Perry Decker. Decker failed to return it. 
He was subsequently charged with grand 
theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1). After 
a jury trial, he was convicted. He now 
appeals, challenging only the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain the conviction. 
Specifically, he contends the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he "intended to 
permanently deprive the victim of the use 
(or] benefit of the vehicle."4 We affirm. 
[1] Appellate review of the sufficiency 
of the evidence is limited in scope. A judg-
ment of conviction, entered upon a jury 
verdict, will not be set aside where there is 
substantial evidence updn which any ration-
al trier of fact could have found the essen-
tial elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); 
State v. FiUon, 101 Idaho 381, 386, 613 
P.2d 938, 943 (1980). "[W]e are precluded 
from substituting our judgment lor that of 
the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, 
the weight of the testimony, and the rea-
sonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence." State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 
705, 718-19, 662 P.2d 1149, 1162-63 <Ct. 
App.1983). Furthermore, we view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the 
respondent. State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho 
199, 203, 646 P.2d 441, 445 (Ct.App.1982). 
[2] We have reviewed the evidence un-
der these standards. The state's evidence 
shows that Decker wanted to purchase a 
motor home from Peterson but that a prob-
lem arose concerning credit approval from 
the bank. The problem -could not be re-
solved until the next day. -Because Decker 
-was on foot, Peterson loaned him a pickup 
truck to be used overnight. Rather than 
returning the vehicle the next day, Decker 
.drove it to Durango, Colorado, where he 
-was eventually arrested. The jury reason-
ably could infer that Decker.intended to 
deprive Peterson of the pickup. 
1. Decker's argument, in so far as it presumes 
that theft requires intent to deprive the owner of 
his property "permanently," fails to take ac-
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, 
affirmed. 
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Elizabeth Mary CARR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Terry Arthur CARR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 15177. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
May 31, 1985. 
In divorce proceeding, magistrate or 
dered sale of community-owned business 
and ordered proceeds divided between par 
ties, and husband appealed. The District 
Court, First Judicial District, Kootena 
County, Watt E. Prather, J., affirmed, and 
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals 
Walters, C.J., held "that: (1) trial court 
could order husband to agree to noncom 
petition clause in sales agreement, thereby 
including goodwill in sale of business; <2] 
truck stop, including its goodwill, was com 
munity asset which should have been val 
ued and distributed by magistrate; and (3) 
trial court was required to determine value 
received for ngoodwill of business and tc 
determine whether unequal division oi 
amount received for goodwill was appropri-
ate. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Swanstrom, J., dissented in part and 
filed opinion. 
count of the modern language of I.C. § 18-2403 
Decker was prosecuted under the modern stat 
ute. 
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1. Divorce <s»286(l) 
Issue of whether trial court could or-
der husband to agree to noncompetition 
clause in sales agreement when family 
business was sold to facilitate property dis-
tribution in divorce proceeding did not be-
come moot when husband signed noncom-
pete provision, as husband agreed to sign 
such provision only to avoid further con-
tempt orders. 
2. Divorce *®=>252.3(2) 
Unless there are compelling reasons to 
divide community assets unequally, division 
of community property in divorce proceed-
ing should be substantially equal. I.C. 
§ 32-712. 
3. Divorce <3=>252.3(2) 
Method by which community property 
is distributed in divorce proceeding is left 
to discretion of trial court, hut ordinarily 
trial court should divide community proper-
ty in such way as to give each spouse the 
sole and immediate control of his or her 
share of property. I.C. § 32-712. 
4. Divorce «=>252.3(5) 
To give each spouse the immediate 
control of his or her share of community 
property distributed in divorce proceeding, 
trial court may provide for sale of commu-
nity property so long as sale order does not 
amount to waste of community asset or 
provide that property be sold for less than 
it is worth. 
5. Divorce <&=>269(2) 
Trial court in divorce proceeding may 
enforce its orders regarding property, dis-
tribution with contempt proceedings. 
6. Divorce <&a>269(9) 
^Trial court is not precluded from issu-. 
ing orders to effectuate property disposi-
tion -decree where order, which might be 
enforced with contempt proceedings, does 
not direct payment of debt. Const. Art 1, 
§ 15. 
7. Divorce 4»252.3(5) 
In ordering .sale of community busi-
ness .to effectuate property disposition in 
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divorce action, trial court may require busi-
ness' goodwill to be included in the sale. 
8. Good Will <3=»4 
Goodwill is property that can be sold 
9. Husband and Wife «=>249<2) 
Goodwill of business owned by spouse 
may be community property, separate prop-
erty or part community property and part 
separate property, depending on circum-
stances. I.C. § 32-903. 
10. Divorce <3=»252.3(1) 
Husband and Wife <&=>248V2, 249(1), 
250, 251 
"Separate property" is all property 
owned by either spouse before marriage, 
and property acquired afterward by gift, 
bequest, devise, or descent; "community 
property" is all other property acquired 
after marriage by either spouse. I.C. 
§§ 32-903, 32-906. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
-definitions. 
11. Husband and Wife <S=>249(2) 
To extent it is acquired through efforts 
of'Spouse during marriage, goodwill of 
community-owned business is community 
property. I.C. § 32-906. 
12. HuBband and Wife *=>249(2) 
Where spouses did not have interest in 
truck stop until after they were married 
and all their labor on behalf of business 
occurred during coverture, -any goodwill 
value of business was community property 
which should have been valued and distrib-
uted upon divorce. I.C. §§ 32-503, 32-906. 
13. Divorce «=»252.3(5) 
In ordering sale of community busi-
ness truck stop to effectuate property dis-
position in divorce action, magistrate did 
•not err by ordering husband to execute 
-reasonable noncompetition agreement, 
thereby including the goodwill in sale of 
truck stop. 
J 4 . Good Will $=»4 
Goodwill of businesses sold when sell-
er Agrees to noncompetition provision in 
sales agreement. 
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15. Divorce ^=252.3(5) 
When family owned business is sold to 
facilitate property division in divorce, trial 
court must consider unique character of 
goodwill along with statutory factors to 
determine whether goodwill asset should 
be divided equally; unique nature of good-
will, its sale by means of noncompetition 
clause, its varying importance to separate 
individuals of marital community, and ef-
fect of its sale on statutory factors may 
constitute compelling reasons to divide val-
ue received for goodwill unequally. I.C. 
§ 32-712. 
16. Divorce <e=>252.3(5) 
In ordering sale of community busi-
ness to effectuate property disposition in 
divorce action, trial court must determine 
value received for goodwill of business and 
must carefully consider statutory factors 
to determine whether unequal division of 
amount received for goodwill is appropri-
ate, and court should also consider tax con-
sequences to spouses resulting from differ-
ing treatment, for tax purposes, of good-
will and of covenants-not to compete. I.C. 
§ 32-712. 
17. Divorce e=>286(l) 
Where court order requiring husband 
to remove sign from adjacent property was 
effective only while sale of community-
owned business was pending, and sale had 
since been completed, propriety of removal 
order was moot. 
18. Constitutional Law ®»69 
Court of Appeals would not issue ad-
visory opinions. 
CJ. Hamilton (argued), Hamilton & 
Hamilton, Steve F. Bell, Coeur d'Alene, for 
defendant-appellant. 
Sue S. Flammia (argued), Flammia & Sol-
omon," Scott W. Reed, Coeur d'Alene, for 
plaintiff-respondent. 
WALTERS, Chief Judge. 
This appeal involves the -disposition of 
property following a divorce decree. "The 
issues concern the sale of a family business 
ordered by the magistrate in the actaotf 
the parties do not contest the division ol 
distribution of any other assets. To <re1 
solve the parties' interests in the family 
business, the magistrate ordered a sale »f 
the business and the proceeds divided be-
tween the parties. Orders by the magis-
trate, directing the husband to executes 
sales agreement containing a covenant not 
to compete and to remove a sign on proper-
ty adjacent to the business, were appealed 
by the husband to the district "court. The 
district court affirmed. The husband ar> 
peals from the district court decision. We 
vacate the district court's decision in part 
and remand for redetermination of the val-
ue and the distribution of the business 
goodwill. 
The issues presented on appeal may be 
stated as follows: (1) when a family busi-
ness is sold to facilitate property distribu-
tion in aT divorce, can a trial court order a 
spouse to agree to a noncompete clause in 
a sales agreement? (2) If so, can the trial 
court's order be enforced with .a contempt 
proceeding? (3) What consideration should 
be given to the goodwill -of a business 
ordered sold in a divorce action? • (4) Can a 
trial court order a sign advertising a com-
peting business to be removed from a for-
mer spouse's separate property until after 
the family business is sold? (5) Should 
either party to this appeal receive an award 
of attorney fees? 
The background of this case is as fol-
lows. - Elizabeth and Terry Carr were mar-
ried in California in 1963. In 1975, the 
Carrs moved to Post Falls, Idaho, and pur-
chased a one-half interest in the Husky 
Port TVuck Stop located near Post Falls. 
They became sole owners of the truck stop 
in 1978. The business prospered under the 
Carrs' management; the physical plant was 
expanded and modernized, a shop to sell 
and service CB radios was added, tire and 
fuel sales increased, restaurant sales flour-
ished. Terry Carr was manager of the 
entire operation except the restaurant, 
which ^ras Jiandled by Elizabeth. -He 
worked twelve to fourteen hours a day at 
the business and was on call twenty-four 
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4tours a day. In 1979, Elizabeth Carr filed 
for divorce. Terry Carr counterclaimed 
and the cause was tried before a magis-
trate. 
Evidence was submitted concerning the 
value of the assets and the amount of 
outstanding liabilities of the truck stop. 
From this evidence, the magistrate deter-
mined the business had a net worth of 
$761,309. The magistrate assigned no val-
ue to "goodwill," concluding that "no credi-
ble evidence was presented at-trial to sup-
port a finding that the business possesses 
any good will upon which a value can be 
placed." Terry Carr was given sixty days 
to purchase Elizabeth Carr's community in-
terest in the truck stop, measured by one-
half its fair market value. For this pur-
pose," the magistrate treated the net worth 
of the business, $761,309, as its fair market 
value. In the event Terry Carr did not 
purchase his ex-wife's interest, the magis-
trate ordered the property to be sold and 
the proceeds divided. Subsequently, Terry 
Carr did not purchase his ex-wife's interest 
in the truck stop, and efforts to sell the 
business to a third party commenced. 
[1] Prospective purchasers insisted on a 
provision in the sales agreement limiting 
Terry Carr's ability to open a competing 
business. One typical noncompete -clause 
prohibited the Carrs for five years from 
opening a competing business within ten 
miles of Husky Port Truck Stop. Because 
Terry Carr owned property adjacent to the 
truck stop, he was opposed to a noncom-
pete clause in any sales agreement, which 
would interfere with his planned use of the 
adjacent property. The magistrate ordered 
Terry Carr to execute a specific earnest 
money agreement containing a covenant to -
not compete and, when he declined to do so, 
the magistrate held Terry Carr in contempt 
of court. To prevent further contempt or-
ders, Terry Carr did subsequently sign an 
earnest money agreement which contained 
a noncompete provision.1 The magistrate 
1. Elizabeth Carr contends the issues regarding 
• the noncompetition clause became moot when 
-Terry Carr executed the sales agreement. It is 
clear Terry Carr agreed to the noncompete pro 
vision only to avoid further contempt orders. 
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also ordered Terry Carr to remove a sign 
announcing a new truck stop business to 
open on the property adjacent to Husky 
Port Truck Stop. On appeal, the magis-
trate's orders were affirmed by the district 
court. 
The district court, finding the noncom-
pete covenant to be reasonable, upheld the 
covenant and concluded that it was within 
the magistrate's discretion to enter an or-
der directing Terry Carr to agree to the 
noncompete provision. The district court 
declined to award additional compensation 
to Terry Carr for his agreement to not 
compete, by alteration of the magistrate's 
distribution of property or-its proceeds. 
The district court viewed the magistrate's 
order to remove the sign as effective only 
while the sale of Husky Port was pending. 
The district court observed that, once the 
sale was completed, Terry Carr was free to 
replace the sign although replacement of 
the sign could generate an action to en-
force the covenant not to compete. The 
magistrate's order regarding the sign was 
therefore upheld. The district court also 
upheld the magistrate's authority to en-
force its orders by contempt proceedings. 
{2] We turn first to the issues concern-
ing the sale of the truck stop. Unless 
there are compelling reasons to divide com-
munity assets unequally, the division of 
community property in a divorce proceed-
ing should be substantially equal. I.C. 
§ 32-712. Here the magistrate found 
there were compelling reasons to make an 
unequal division of the community property 
owned by the parties. We have not been 
asked to review the propriety of that deter-
mination. In regard to the truck stop, the 
magistrate ordered that Elizabeth Carr 
should receive the first $4,846 from the 
proceeds of the sale of the business and the 
balance divided equally. 
In those circumstances,-we hold the authority of 
the magistrate to order execution of the limiting 
clause and the subsequent finding of contempt 
should riot bar appellate review of the issues 
raised herein. 
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[3-6] The method by which the proper-
ty is distributed is left to the discretion of 
the trial court, Koontz v. Koonlz, 101 Ida-
ho 51, 607 P,2d 1325 (1980), but ordinarily 
the trial court should divide the community 
property in such a way as to give .each 
spouse the sole and immediate control of 
his or her share of the property. Parker v. 
Parker, 95 Idaho 876, 522 P.2d 788 (1974). 
Thus, to give each spouse the immediate 
control of his or her share of the property, 
the trial court may provide for the sale of 
community property so long as the sale 
order does not amount to waste of a com-
munity asset or provide that the property 
be sold for less than it is worth. Id. The 
trial -court in a divorce proceeding may 
enforce its -orders regarding property dis-
tribution with contempt proceedings. See 
Phillips v. -District - Court of the Fifth 
Judicial District, 55 Idaho'404, .609 P.2d 
1325 (1973).2 
[7] In this case,'6ie trial court ordered 
Terry Carr to execute an earnest money 
agreement containing a covenant to not 
compete for five years and within ten miles 
of Husky Port Terry Carr .subsequently 
was held in contempt of court for failing to 
"sign the earnest money agreement.3 As 
noted, when the .magistrate made findings 
of .the values of the various properties 
owned by .the parties, the magistrate was 
not able, because of. a Jack of credible evi-
dence, to assign any value to the goodwill 
component of the truck stop. See Saviers 
v. Saviers, 92 Idaho 117, 438 P.2d 268 
^1968); Loveland v. Xoveland, 91 Idaho 
400, 422 P.2d 67 (1967) (no error where trial 
court failed to divide value of goodwill of 
community business in divorce actions 
when The evidence was insufficient to es-
2. - Terry Carr cites "Phillips for a broad proposi-
tion that the trial pourt may not issue any post-
divorce orders unrelated to a former spouse's 
rfduty to support his wife or children. "The prop-
osition is erroneous. ;Phillips-he\d the iriaj 
court's order of .contempt did not violate art. 1, 
§ 15 of the Idaho Constitution. That section 
•prohibits imprisonment for debt. Phillips held 
jm order oCxxmtempt, and subsequent imprison-
ment, for failure to satisfy a property settlement 
5debt does not violate art. 1, § 15 if the debt was 
-related to the former spouse's obligation to sup-
jport -his wife or children. 'Phillips does not 
tablish value of goodwill). Subsequent^ 
•however, because of the demands by^&K 
chasers for a covenant not to compete,<Jfe| 
believe the existence of the goodi3| 
achieved a much greater significance;.!, 
determining an appropriate division of f&m 
-parties' property interests. In effect,-li^ 
ordering Terry Carr to execute the noncorih 
petition clause, the magistrate was requirb 
ing that the goodwill x>f the truck stop 
business be sold -along with the tangible 
assets and the accounts receivable. r/ 
In instances where a part}' sells his 
business, and, in connection with such 
sale, agrees that he will not engage In 
the same or similar business in the same 
area for a particular and reasonable 
. length of time, it is obviously the inten; 
tion on the seller's part to sell the good 
will of the business, even though the 
contract, as in,this instance, fails to ex-
pressly mention good will. [Citations 
omitted.] 
Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95,101, 227 
P.2d 74, 77 <1951). Given the trial court's 
authority in a tUvorce action to order <-the 
sale of a community business to effectuate* 
property disposition, the issue is whether a 
trial court may require a business's good-
will to be Included in the sale. We hold 
that it may. 
{8] Our Supreme Court long ago recog-
nized that the goodwill of a ousiness "is a 
species of property subject t o sale by the 
proprietor, and which may be sold by order 
of court " Harshbarger v. Eby, 28 Ida-
ho 753, 761, 156 P. *19, 621 (1916),'quoting 
Smock v. Pierson, 68 Ind. 405734 Am.Rep. 
269 (1879). Goodwill is an intangible busi-
ness asset not easily defined. 
preclude a trial court from issuing orders to 
effectuate a property disposition decree where 
the order, which might be -enforced -with con-
t^empt proceedings, does not direct payment of a 
-debt. 
3. The earnest money agreement signed by Terry 
—Carnwhich eventually resulted in a sale of the 
^business contained a covenant not to compete 
^for five -years within fiv5 miles of the Husky 
Port Truck Stop. 
CARR v. 
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The "good will" value of any business 
enterprise is that value which results 
from the probability that old customers 
will continue to trade or deal with mem-
bers of an established concern. It is the 
probability that old customers will resort 
to the old place or seek old friends, and 
the likelihood of new customers being 
attracted to well-advertised and favor-
ably known services or goods. 
Good will is the advantage or benefit 
which is acquired by an establishment, 
beyond the mere value of the capital, 
stocks, funds or property employed 
therein, in consequences of the general 
patronage and encouragement which it 
receives from constant or habitual cus-
tomers on account of its location, or local 
position or reputation for quality, skill, 
integrity or punctuality. It is something 
in business which gives reasonable ex-
pectancy of preference in the race of 
competition. 
Good will is property, so recognized 
and protected by law. As such it is 
subject to bargain and sale. [Footnotes 
omitted.] 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 
P.2d 667, 670 (1966). However it is de-
fined, goodwill clearly is property that can 
be sold. 
[9-13] Further, goodwill of a business 
owned by a spouse may be community 
property, separate property or part commu-
nity property and part separate property, 
depending on the circumstances. Separate 
property is all property owned by either 
spouse before marriage, and the property 
acquired afterward by gift, bequest, devise, 
or descent. I.C. § 32-903. Community 
property is all other property acquired af-
ter marriage by either spouse. I.C. § 32-
906. Thus, to the extent it is acquired 
through the efforts of a spouse ^during 
4. There appears to be a split of authority as to 
whether the goodwill of a professional practice 
is a divisible or awardable asset in a divorce 
action. See ANNOT., 52 A L.R3d 1344 (1973). 
Because the case before us does not involve a 
professional practice, we do not decide that 
question today. 
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marriage, the goodwill of a community 
owned business is community property. In 
this case, the Carrs did not have an interest 
in- the truck stop until after they were 
married. All their labor on behalf of the 
business occurred during coverture. Ac-
cordingly, any goodwill value of the busi-
ness was community property which should 
have been valued and distributed upon di-
vorce.4 See Mueller v. Mueller, 144 CaL 
App.2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); Hurley v. 
Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980); 
Matter of Marriage ofFleege, 91 Wash.2d 
324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). The magistrate 
did not err by ordering Terry Carr to exe-
cute a reasonable noncompetition agree-
ment, thereby including the goodwill in the 
sale of the truck stop.5 See Lord v. Lord, 
454 A.2d 830 (Me.1983) (trial court could 
order the wife to execute a reasonable non-
competition clause to protect the goodwill 
of a business awarded to the husband). 
[14] The magistrate had initially con-
cluded the value of Husky Port Truck Stop 
contained no component of goodwill. The 
business had not yet been sold and the 
proceeds divided in accordance with the 
magistrate's plan for distribution of the 
community assets, when the noncompete 
agreement became an issue in the divorce. 
As Vancil v. Anderson, supra indicates, 
the goodwill of a business is sold when the 
seller agrees to a noncompetition provision 
in the sales agreement It is clear the 
purchasers here were interested in ac-
quiring more than the real property, equip-
ment, inventory, and accounts receivable of 
Husky Port Truck Stop. The purchasers 
also sought .to purchase the business's 
goodwill, as is evident by then*-insistence 
upon a noncompetition clause in the sales 
-agreement On the record ^ before lis, we 
conclude that goodwill comprised a portion 
of the value of the truck stop and that the 
5. Terry Carr does not argue on appeal the dis-
tance and duration restrictions of the noncom-
petition clause are more than necessary to pro-
tect the truck stop's goodwill, making the clause 
unreasonable and thus invalid. See Stipp v. 
^Wallace Plating, Inc., 96 Idaho 5, 523 P.2d B22 
(1974). 
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community-owned^ business* including- its* 
goodwill was a community asset1 which 
should have been-valued and distributed by* 
the magistrate? -
[15,16] It remains to be determined 
whether? t^he value, received for goodwill, 
should be divided equally. As already not-
ed, the 'division of community property 
should be* substantially equal unless there 
are competing reasons to divide It unequal-
ly, Terry Carr insists that he is entitled to 
compensation for his agreement to not 
compete with the Husky Port Truck Stop. 
We agree that there may be compelling 
reasons in this case to justify an unequal 
division of the proceeds from the sale of 
the truck stop. It is clear Terry Carr was 
less willing than Elizabeth Carr to be re-
stricted front opening another truck stop 
business. Terry Carr owned property suit-
able for another-truck stop and he an-
nounced his intention to open a new busi* 
ness at the earliest opportunity. His sale 
of the-goodwill of Husky Port Truck. Stop 
may have significantly affected his occupa-
tion* amount and source of income, use of 
vocational skills, employability, and present 
and potential earning* capability, all factors 
to be considered in determining whether a 
community property division should be 
equal. Seel.C. § 32-712. When * family-
owned business is sold to facilitate a prop-
erty division in a divorce, we believe the 
trial court must consider the unique charac-
ter of goodwill along with the factors in 
I.C. § 32-712 to determine whether the 
goodwill asset should be divided equally. 
The unique nature of goodwill, its sale by" 
means of a noncompetition clause, its vary-
ing importance to the separate individuals 
of the marital community, and the effect of 
its sale on the section 32-712 factors may 
constitute compelling reasons to divide the 
value received for goodwill unequally. Be-
cause the magistrate did not consider the 
goodwill of Husky Port Truck Stop after 
the property was sold subject to the non-
compete agreement, we vacate the proper-
ty distribution decree regarding the truck 
stop. On remand, the trial court must de-
termine the value received for the goodwill 
of the business, and must carefully consid-
er the-factors* listed in I.C.§ 32-712 to 
determine whether an unequal division of 
the amount received for the goodwill is 
appropriate. The court should also consid-
er the tax' consequences (if any) to the 
Carrs, vis-a-vis each other and vis-a-vis the 
buyer of the truck stop, resulting from 
differing treatment, for tax purposes, of 
goodwill and of covenants not to compete. 
[17,18] We decline to determine Terry 
Carr's contention that the magistrate erred 
by ordering the removal of the sign from 
property adjacent to the truck stop. Re-
moval of the sign was ordered to avoid 
discouraging prospective vendees from 
making offers to purchase the truck stop. 
Because the removal order was effective 
only while the sale of Husky Port Truck 
Stop was pending, and the sale has since 
been completed, the propriety of the remov-
al order is moot; although, as noted by the 
district court, replacement of the sign may 
be viewed as a breach of the noncompete 
agreement Thus, our discussion of the 
issue would resolve no actual controversy. 
We decline to issue advisory opinions. See 
Radermacher v. Eckert, 63 Idaha 531, 123 
P.2d 426 (1942). 
Both parties seek an award of attorney 
fees on appeal. The award of attorney 
fees in a divorce action is controlled by I.C. 
§ 32-704. Because of the remand to deter-
mine the disposition of the goodwill compo-
nent of the Husky Port Truck Stop we are 
faced with an incomplete record upon 
which we can consider the factors required 
under I.C. § 32-704 in order to award at-
torney fees. Therefore, we instruct the 
trial court on remand to determine whether 
an award of attorney fees, for this appeal, 
should be made to either party. See, e.g., 
Donndelinger v. Donndelinger, 107 Idaho 
431, 690 P.2d 366 (Ct.App.1984). 
The district court's order affirming the 
magistrate's distribution of Husky Port 
Truck Stop proceeds is vacated. The cause 
is remanded to ascertain the proceeds at-
tributable to the goodwill of the business 
and to determine an appropriate division of 
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those proceeds. Costs to appellant,, Terry 
Carr. 
BURNETT, J., concurs. 
SWANSTROM, J., dissenting in part 
I would affirm the district court's order 
in. total. The majority remands for the 
trial court to redetermine the value of 
^goodwill. However, there is no real equa-
tion which the trial court can apply to re-
late the value of goodwill to the amount, if 
any, the husband should be paid for his 
agreement not to compete. That is be-
cause, as the majority opinion correctly 
shows, goodwill is comprised of many vari-
able components. There is no definite rela-
tionship between goodwill and a* covenant 
not to compete unless the parties to a 
transaction agree both as to the value of 
the goodwill and the value of the covenant 
-This determination is not made without the 
"participation of the buyer, as well as the 
s^ellers*. Here, the sale has been completed; 
the purchase price fully paid 
?-The husband contends in the trial court 
that the goodwill of the business had no 
.separate value. From evidence already 
presented once, the magistrate was- unable 
to assign any separate value to goodwill. I 
see little to be gained by a remand on this 
'point The fact remains that after the trial 
court has made its new determination of 
the value of the goodwill, whether it is $1 
or $100,000, there will be no additional dol-
lars available for distribution from the sale 
oi the community business. This is not a 
case where an asset was omitted from the 
distribution or not considered^ 
f- Finally, the husband's contention that he 
& entitled to a greater share of the sale 
proceeds because of his agreement not to 
'compete is not convincing in light of his 
previous conduct First, he took the unten-
able position of trying to sell the business,. 
J(ith the expectation of obtaining the best 
Ifrice, while advertising to the world his 
intention to open- a competing business on 
adjoining property. Regardless of whether 
the business to be sold haa any ascertain-
able goodwill value, a reasonable and pru-
dent purchaser would not agree to pay as 
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much—if indeed he would purchase at all— 
under such circumstances. 
Had the husband here wanted to contin-
ue in the operation of this type of business-
at the same location he could have done so. 
The trial court allowed him" every reason-
able opportunity to purchase the wife's in-
terest in the business. This included at-
least one opportunity to meet the bona fide 
offer of a prospective purchaser. The hus^ 
band first said that he would and later he-
declined. Now, he wants to be compensat-
ed for not being able to compete in close-
proximity to the business he left I am not 
persuaded that there is any legal or eq-
uitable grounds for a remand. 
Douglas S. CLARK and Pamela J. -
Clark, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
George ENNEKING, 
Defendant-Respondent 
No. 15149. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
May 31, 1985. 
Homeowners brought suit against con-
tractor seeking recovery for damages- al-
legedly sustained when contractor disrupt-
ed homeowners' sewer service- The Dis-
trict Court, Second Judicial District, Idaho-
County, George R. Reinhardt II, J., af-
firmed magistrate division judgment in fa-
vor of contractor, and homeowners appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, CJ., 
held that substantial competent evidence 
supported jury's verdict in favor of contrac-
tor. 
Affirmed. 
Burnett, J., concurred in the result 
